'l'hose new procedures wereacover for genuinel~'restrictive policy actions that reversed the upward ratcheting of inflation begun in the 1960s. It threatened to get out of hand in 1979. Such a policy rever'sal was altogether appropriate, but, as in earlier episodes, it represented an abr'upt shift in direction made necessary because earlier' policy had taken the economy so firr ofi' course. Whether' or not the Federal Reserve genuinely attempted to control growth in the monetary aggregates beginning in 1979, it no longer does. The reason is not that it could not, hut that the r-ehationship between growth in the aggregates and GNP, and in turn inflation, appeared so unpredictable. Consequently, in recent years the Federal Reserve has reverted to manipulating open market purchases and sales of securities to hold federal funds rates or free reserves within tar'get ranges as was the practice from the 1920s until 1973. In 1961, 500fl after leaving the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, I gave a talk there in which I criticized Feder'al Reserve operating procedures for focusing on free reserves or interest i'ates rather than growth in the monetary aggregates. The Federal Reserve was characterized as a baseball player' who can't hit a curve. He s~imigsat where the ball was, not where it is. The example I cited was the experience in 19(30 when the Federal Reserve persisted in tat'geting lower and lower interest rates even as monetary growth turned negative and the economy slipped into recession.
The Chairman of the Board of Governots of the Federal Reserve in those (lays was William McChesney Martin. Ite likened the role of monetary policy to ''leaning against the wind,'' the idea being that money market conditions as measured by interest r'ares or free r'esen'es would tighten during business expansions and ease during contractions. In 1988, the Federal Reserve no longer tightens, it snugs. Whatever the name, there isaprob1cm with this approach. Even if the Federal Reserve takes no action, interest rates can change because of changes in total spending in the economy and associated credit demands. 'fEe r'isk is that the Federal Reserve will attribute a decline in interest rates, as ii did in 1960, to its policies when in fact, by not selecting a low enough interest rate There are problems associated with interest rate targets, but what about monetary targets? My presentation today addresses whether' the relationship between monetary growth and GNP has become so unpredictable as to justiI~'the abandonment of mnonetary targets which seems to have occurred.
MONETARISM AND THE QUANTITY THEORY
Monetarism, the apparent heir of the Quantity Theory of Money, was born in the 1960s. Not only was the name changed but also the concept. Unlike [he Quantity Theory, whose focus is on the long run, monetar'ism was widely interpreted as providing an alternative to short run Keynesian model for'ecasts, a view not always shared by its progenitors.
The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis equation, which explained quarterly GNP growth largely as a function of monetary growth, became a major' monetar'isl forecasting tool.' Its simplicity and apparent reliability captured the one-dimensional attention of Wall Street and Washington. GNP gr-owth was estimated to reflect groi~4hin narrowly defined money, Ml, in the current quar'ter and the pretious year; and it was found to rise about 3 percent a year' independently of monetary growth. With hindsight, we know that this stable Ml velocity trend was peculiar to the per'iod on which the estimates were based, initially the 1950s and 1960s hut then the unfolding 1970s as well.
The Federal Reserve flank of St. Louis model went beyond the estimated GNP or demand growth equation to incorporate potential supply growth which together determined inflation and unemployment, and a credit market which determined interest rates By the end of the 1970s and into the 1980s, the weekly publication of Ml changes became a major' news event and market force because these data provided a basis for forecasts of total demnand growth, inflation and interest rates.
'fhe pr'oblem with the simplistic monetarism that afflicted Wall Street and Washington was that it accepted Milton Friedman's dictum that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon but not his stipulation that lags are long and variable.
My point today builds on this theme. Monetary policy actions are appropriately directed at longr-un stability of the general level of prices but not at offsetting undesired short-term movements in total demand, unemployment, or, for that matter', prices. I shall argue that we know enough to keep inflation trends within bounds but not enough to fully stabilize the pr-ice level let alone the business cycle. A corollary is that monetarism as a shortrun for'ecasting method should be buried; but the Quantity Theory, defined as the predictability of GNP growth on the basis of growth in the monetary aggregates, should he recognized as the correct principle for controlling intlation in the long r'un; and Federal Resetve operating pr-ocedures should be made consistent with that principle.
SHORT-TERM FORECASTS
Let me make a few remarks about short-term forecasts. None ar'e very good for' very long. Based on l-'ederal Reserve "green" hooks, Allan Meltzer reports that the Federal Reserve's record of forecasting nominal GNP growth a year ahead ovet' the period 1967 thr'ough 1982 had a root mean square error equal to about 60 percent of average nominal GNP growth.' Since GNP growth averaged about 10 percent a year', the forecast err-or is 6 per'centage points, indicating that one-third of the tinie forecasts would mniss by more than 6 percentage points and half the time by more than 4 percentage points. Furthermore, and most important, the Federal Reserve forecasts were way off track, missing avei-age gr-owth by more than 5 per'centage points, the result of the Federal Reserve persistentlv underestimating GNP growth during a pe- 
HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIPS: THE BROAD PICTURE
The historical relationship between monetary growth and spemiding confirms Jones' suspicion. Let me present some charts which put the experience of the 1980s in perspective.
Chart 1 recomds inflation in the United States since 1907, with 1907-45 and 1946-87 plotted separatelv. The blue-shaded areas identify recessions. Quite clearly inflation was a lot mom-c variable in the initial period, though, because of deflations dur-ing i-ecessions in the earlier' period, there was no sustained inflation ti-end as theme was in the second period.
Chart 2 plots the real GNP growth i-ate -a nieasure of growth in the m'eal supply of goods and services. Though it averaged about 3 pem'cent a year both before and after the end of 1945, the magnitude of the booms and busts was much gr'eater in the eamlier period. Since real growth averaged about as much in each period, it follows that the inflation uptrend in the second period was an aggregate demand not an aggregate supply phenomenon.
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Chart 3 presents the nominal GNP gr-owth rate
Post-1945
Quarterly Log Growth, Seasonally Adjusted -a measw-e of growth in nominal demand for goods and services. Though mnost values are positive, there are some big negatives in recessions thr'ough 1960. Since then them-c has been slowed, not negative, GNP gm'owth dum-ing m'ecessions because we have had considerable inflation even in recessions. In terms of proximate causes, Char't 3 shows that slowed GNP growth has always been associated with slowed i-c-al growth in recessions, and accelem-ated GN P growth with accelerated real growth in expansions. i'hus, decreased var-iability in meal growth imi thu post-World War II period is linked to less van'iahility in nominal GNP growth.
What about soum-ces of nominal GNP growth? Conventional wmsdom to the contrary, the tinning of govurmnent spending and tax changes is not systematically con-related with GNP growth. 'l'he 1980s provide a good example. Fiscal policy by every measure was expansionarv, yet nominal GNP growth contracted.
Chart 4 plots the ratio of nominal federal debt held by the public to nominal GNP. Them-c is a nominal deficit if the debt rises, but a real deficit only if the debt r-ises faster' than inflation. An increase in the debt to GNP ratio m'efiects the real deficit rising faster than real gm'owth. The historical recom'd shows that real deficits relative to real GNP did not amoutit to much before Won-Id War' I. Big r'eal defk:its occurred in both World Wars, the early 1930s, and since 1980. Since nominal GNP growth accelerated in the wai-s hut decelerated in the 1930s and 1980s, them-c is no consistent m'ela- T-statrstrcs rn parentheses Independent va'rab'es are changes Iron: Inc lasI bus'n°sscycle averace rn the estrmatron perroo to the average for the fcrecasl porioo.
HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIPS: SPECIFIC FORECASTS
William Gavin and I have been studying the quality of quarterly GNP forecasts based on the monetary aggregates. Though them-c am-c mtiany studies that have examined the post-florid War II period, we were inten-ested in a hm'oader historical experience. Our focus was on out-of-sample fon'ecasts -the kind needed to direct monetary aggi'egate changes to achieve a desired GNP growth path. Quan-terly GNP growth for-c-casts for-each business cycle were based on estimates of the relationship hetxveen GNP growth and four quaytenly lags of monetary growth for the three pn-eceding cycles, that is ,a modified St. Louis equation. On the average, both Ml and M2 changes were estimated to change GNP gi-ow'th roughly pnopor'-tionally while velocity ti-ends were significant in relating Ml but not Ma to GNP. Overall there were 15 forecast intervals for M2 hut only 13 for Nil because there was no quar-tei-lv information about the split between demand and time deposits before 1914. 'the first forecast for Mi was the business cycle 1924:4 -1927:4. <There are many factors that influence GNP gn-owth. Consequently, in our-single equation models that n-elate GNP growth solely to monetary gn-owth, we expected that shifts in the econon'm including mnonetan' policy n-c-actions to economic performance would lead to biases in the forecasts. For' example, we expected that lower-inter-c-st mates in a fon'ecast period wotrld decrease velocity and m'educe GNP growth relative to monetary gr-owth. To measure the effect of sttch shifts, we regressed aver-age forecast en'i'oi-s on changes in imiflation. intenest rates and real growth fr-om the last business cycle in the estimation interval to the aver-age observed in the forecast cycle.
As noted, there was a large decrease in the variance of forecasts from the pm-e-1946 to the post-1945 period. To account for' such hemeroscedasticity, we weighted observations b the expected standaril deviation of the mnean forecast ermors and then used ordinarv least sqtrares to estimate effects of shifts in inflation, interest n'ates amid n-cal gi-owlh tm-ends on forecast error's. Table I pm-esents the results. 'tile only consistent link to forecast er-r'ors was change in the inflation tn'end, not in ten'-est rates, and not real growth.
Gawn and L also examined cross-countn' cvideuce. 'the nc-suIts appear' in table 2. We estimated the r'elatiomiship between annual GNP gr-owth and curn-ent and lagged Ml growth for' 39 countries for' the late 1950s through 1979. CNP growth forecasts for' each country were made for 1980-84. As in ot,mr [/5. Lime ser-ies analysis, these cross-country GNP fon-ecast error-s were stm'omiglv corn'elated with changes in inflation trends, even excluding outlien's such as Bolivia, Br'azil, Mexico and Penn that had huge inflation accelerations in the 1980s.
Why the consistent link to shifts in inflation trends? Look at chan-t 9. It is apparent that wide swings in interest rates over the business cycle wen-e not closely related to Ml velocity moventents. Fun'them-mom'e, since real growth aver-aged about the same hefbn-e as after the c-mid of 1945, one cannot attr-ibute the persistent mise in Ml velocity until 1982 to that sour-ce. Rather', the rise in Ml velocity after' 1945 was associated with a persistent rise in the inflation tm'end. Chan-t 10 reveals a mnuch weaker association between M2 velocity and interest rates and much less of a tretid. The shift in the sen'ies is attributable to a n-c-definition of Ma in 1959 to include a van-iety of non-bank liabilities that wen'e not in the l"riedman and Schwartz definition.
Chart 11, which plots only n-c-cent data, reveals a close relationship between Ma velocity and the Treasury bill tate less a calculated weighted average own-nate on Ma! tiepository institutions n-c--spond to pen'sistent changes in market rates by altering deposit nates, but, even when unconstrained by deposit interest ceilings, adjustments an-c-not that quick or' complete. Since the post-war ratcheting up of interest n'atc-s reflected ati uptrend in inflation, it follows that lags in setting (Ic-posit interest rates led to nising opportunity costs of holding Ma balances and to increased Ma velocity when inflation trended up strongly as in 1978-80. In the opposite circumstances when inflation trended down stnongly as in 1982-87, falling opportunity costs of holding M2 balances decreased Ma velocity. Something similar was going oti in ear-tier years too. 'l'hus, Gavin and I found that shifts in inflation tnends, hut not interest rates, were consistently tied to error's in GNP gi-owth forecasts based on not only Ml but also M2 growth. the cur-i-c-nt cycle. Our-finding that forecast en-n-or-s ane smaller-for M2 than for Ml or Mlk hut not by a large niangin suggests n-ohustness to the choice of the monetary aggregate." We also looked at the monetany base and found that Ma mnodels pr'ovided the best forecasts on average for both 1907-45 and 1946-87. Turning again to table 3, some forecast en-nor's are huge. Root mean squat-c-er'r'ons average 17 to 18 percent in the pre-1946 period, though only about 6 percent in the post-World War II per-iod. By the standards tfiat Meltzer-discussed, such en't'ons are compan-able to Federal Reserve forecast en-ror's in the "green" book. An infen'ence is that attempts to fine tune GNP growth by contn-olling either-Ml or Ma growth would miss GL'JP growth tai'gets by more than 6 percentage points one-third of the What was said about not being able to distinguish boom fromn recession holds for-our for'ecasts just as for the Federal Reserve's. However, then-c-is a difference. '['Ihe average forecast er-ron-associated with our-simple n-elationship of monetary growth to noniinal GNP gi-owth appear's to be well under the reported average error's in Feden-al Reserve "green" hooks that Mettzer repor-ted.
OPERATIONAL ISSUES
The operational question is what to do in the short run to achieve a lorig-ren-m inflation objective. Suffice it to say than the Federal Reserve need not imn out every wrinkle in monetary gn-owth to eliminate inflation trends, but it is necessany to tie monetary gr'owth to real gnowth oser the medium gnowtti even as it tipplied funds to support ar rrI ter'm to avoid the kind of disturbances thit shifts crating monetary gno~th which wa reflected in in inflation trends ngc nder. 1 he I ederal Resen e ac-cc-len ating inflation higher' tntei c-st mates, an needs to adopt systematic operational pn ocedun c-s inc-n easing t elo ity trend and uncxpc-ctcdlv tat ge to shift its policy tan-gets on the basis of obsen-vc d GNP gn'otvth. Could that sad c-yr Ic have been deuations of GNP gn-owth from desired h-ic-Is. a~oided?
One wa would hate the F c-dc-tat Resc-r-ie set a Suppose in 1978 to pick a year the I eden aI Re GNP gi-owth target cqual to long ten m real growth serve had aimcd at 3 percent ic-al growth -the plus an inflation target perhaps zero in the long long tr-rm aienagc -arid an inflation target 2 penn-un but not unreasonably only a partial step in entage points betmi the 6.8 pc-ic ctit inflation in that direction in any one period. fhc-point is riot 1977. target GNP growth for 19e8 would hate hr n to set monetary targcts on tin, basis of short run 7.8 perccnt' fon' 1979, 5.8 pen cent: 1980, 3.8 pen cent; forecasts of what neal and nominal GNP gn oith is 1981 and thereafter 3 pc-i Cent the long-ten m predicted 1 hope I have made cleat-hots c-i r'oraverage n cat gi'ovi th i-alt. prone such forecasts an-c--but n athei on the basis of long-run real growth projections plus an in Fourth-quartet -us er-foun th quai-tr r C P growth in 19e8 was 14.8 pen cent not e.8 percent. G'\ F' flation goal riot a c-urn-nt (AP forecast. growth stavccl high: 9.~,pen c c-nt nn 1979 and again Such a procedurc in the l 9 iOs would hate led in 1980. Inflation accelerated: 7.7 perccnt in 19z8 to very difterent results from tihat we got. I he 8.5 percent in 1979 and 9.4 per-c c-nn in 1980. Pant of I ederal Reserve pen sistently unden'for'ecast GM' the problem was using telocitv hut the pm obleni A somewhat similar proposal is found in Bennett McCallum "Robustness Properties of a Rule for Monetary Policy" Carnegre-Rochester Conference Series on Publmc Policy, Vol 29 forthcoming was compounded bc-c-misc-the t"eder'al Reserve validated the inflation process by an open man-ket policy that per'mitled monetary aggregate growth of no less than 7 pen-cent in any of those year's and by as much as 11 percent. Ft was riot distinguishing between the wind it was leaning against and the thrust of its own actions.
One cannot he cem-tain about velocity movemerits in the shom't i-un but in the circumstances of the late 1970s with a rising inflation tic-nd, one could have anticipated rising velocities. By whateven' means the Federal Reserve might have chosen to control its open mar-ken operations -tai'getitig free reserves, feden-aI funds rates, or-monetary base injections -over the course of those years it would have had to take actions to n-c-strict monetary gr-owth to pt-event inflation from acceler-ating.
What was n-equin-ed in 1978, if not sooiier, was a gentiiniet~mestnictive policy such as we finally got in 1980-81. That policy anrived too late to avoid enon-mous economic destruction. Inflationary expectations had become enti-enched in market contracts denominated in dollars. 'The costs of disinflation: the worst recession since the 1930s, an oven-hanging lnmrden of domestic and international debt accumulated on the basis of mistaken price expectations, and a legacy of uncertainty about whether it might not happen again.
WHY NOT TARGET NOMINAL GNP GROWTH?
It is my contention that putting a GNP target up front for the Federal Open Market Committee to aim at would allow it to mobilize its staff to design the best way to keep monetary growth and GNP growth down when such a course is ohvioust right as it was in the late 1970s.There is doubtlessly an element of discretionary fine-tuning in c;NP targeting, but with a twist. Deviations fr'om the tar-get nominal GNI' path should induce Federal Reserve actions to move monetary growth up on-down in order to hr-ing for-c-cast GNI' gr-owth hack to a long-run non-inflationary path. Perhaps. them-c-should be some limit on how much change in targeted GNP to be permitted in a particular period. In any case, to avoid getting off tm-ac-k as in the 1970s, the Federal Reserve has to direct its considenab]e power-s toward controlling inflation trends by actions that push monetany growth in the right direction when nominal GNI' growth is off tat-get.
CONCLUSION
To eliminate inflation tm-ends, monetary gr-owth must he kept low on average and close to n-eat gn-owth tnends. Extraoi-dinany inc-i-eases as in 1977-79 or 1985-86 ought to he avoided so that offsetting dec-i-eases am-c-not necessitated; hut the past is histony. What ahout the future? Cei-tainty we want to avoid another cycle of inflation and disinflation. liv tuck or design the Fedenal Reserve in 1987 and early 1988 has pursued policies that are not so different from what I have suggested. Monetary aggregates an-c-gm-owing at about 4 percent annual rates, close to appr-opi-iate rates to hn-ing inflation down gradually toward zero. I would hope that the lessons of history could he applied to stay on such a path.
A positive i-c-form to make r:leam the r-esponsibilities of the Feden-al Reserve n'egamding long-ternir inflation would he to bring it into the fedeial budget process. Etave it announce nominal GNP targets each year' on which to base Administration budget projections over the ensuing five fiscal years. Both GNP growth and inflation are critical to the budget with n'espect to tax receipts and expenditures, pan-ticularly interest outlays. Why have the Adniinisttation make an'bitrary assumptions about GNP grriwth and inflation as it does now when the Federal Reserve, whose power's are so important in deter-mining nominal magnitudes, could tar-get such values and be held accountable for attaining them? It should take responsibility for what it can control in the medium termnominal spending growth and inflation -and not play meteonotogist by leaning against the uncertain winds of the business cycle.
Can we devise ways to create the right incentives for Federal Reserve officials to pursue policies to keep inflation low? The Germans and the Japanese have. In contrast to their success in keeping inflation low, we have gone through the motions of having the Federal Reserve announce monetary target ranges to Congressional Oversight Committees beginning in 1975, and since then the woi'st cycle of inflation and disinflation since Wortd War II. Setting medium-term tan-gets for-GNP growth as I have recommended would establish a new n-esponsibilitv. However-, unless the monetary authorities shoulder-that responsibility by taking actions to stabilize nominal GNF' gn-owth ai-ound a medium-term non-inflationany path, nothing would bc-gained. Establishing yet another target i'ange would make sc-rise only if deviations from it induced stabilizing policy reactions.
Per'haps, the Fedenal Reserve must he put on a shorter' leash? We could speci~'a legal limit to the monetary base that the Federal Reserve was authorized to put into circulation in a fiscal year-. Budget authoi-ity is r-equired for' the Treasury to spend, why not for the Fedenal Reserve? 'I'hen again, it might be somewhat unn-ealistic to count on Congress to check the inflationary tendencies of the Federal Reserve. An even shorten' leash has been suggested by Milton Fmiednian and not in jestl. He would disband the Fedemal Open Mam-ket Committee and hire a federal employee to pun'-chase Treasury securities each week as specified by law to keep some monetary aggregate on a lorig-term zeno inflation course. Despite the budget savings in his proposal, wide variation in velocities historically suggests that we might do hetter than fixing a monetary growth rate in perpetuity.
The fact is that hm'oadty stabilizing monetary policies have been observed on occasion in history. Even during the past decade, sonic countries have managed their-affairs to avoid the worst excesses of inflation arid disinflation that we and many other-s experienced. We can't repeat history, but we ought to learn from it. In the light of the contribution of Fedemat Reserve actions to instability in monetary growth, nominal GNP growth and inflation, having it target a non-inflationary nominal GNP growth path oven' a five-year federal budget cycle would be a step in the right din-cction. Responsibility for conti-ol of inflation would he assigned to the institution that has the most direct power to influence nominal GNP gm-owth and, in turn, inflation. For nominal GNP targeting to succeed in eliminating inflation tn-ends, however, Fedem-al Reserve officials must have the unpotic~actions to get back to a non-inflationary GNP growth path whenever the target is missed. If they did implement such a policy, they would not likely eliniinate all the ups and downs in the c-cononiy, but they would avoid repeating the most egi-egious mistakes of monetary history.
DATA SOURCES
Data used in preparing the charts and statistical study summarized in this lecture came from a variety of sources, All computation were performed on an IBM AT using RATS PC version 2.0 or LOTUS version 2.01.
Data from different sources were spliced by transforming the early series to growth rates and computing revised level series based on actual levels of the most recent series.
The original data used in the Gavin and Dewald study are available from the author on a LOTUS spreadsheet upon request with an accompanying 51/4 inch diskette and a stamped, den'standing and c-our-age to support the necessary self-addressed disk mailer.
